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NOTES
RESTITUTION IN MINORS' CONTRACTS IN CALIFORNIA
Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of the law of minors'
contracts is the general lack of any single, consistent principle under-
lying the decisions. Irreconcilable conflict has resulted from attempts
to protect the minor on the one hand and to prevent injustice to
persons dealing with the minor on the other.' The courts attempt
to achieve a satisfactory balance between these two apparently con-
flicting principles in cases where the minor seeks to disaffirm his
contract and recover the consideration he has paid. Should infancy
be a defense against a claim for restitution, in addition to being a
defense against binding the infant to the contract? A different
balance may result depending upon whether the minor retains the
consideration in specie, or has parted with it, or retains all or part
of it in a used or damaged condition.2
The current patchwork of rules is at least partially the result
of courts deciding cases without having first completed the logically
antecedent step of adequately formulating the reason and purpose
for giving special protection to minors.3 "[W]e cannot know what
kinds of rules to make until we know more clearly what the goal
to be reached by the infancy doctrine is."'4
In any transaction in which an infant has contracted with an
adult, the likelihood that someone will be injured is great. Without le-
gal protection, that person will almost invariably be the infant. But
in its zeal to prevent this, the law has sometimes overcompensated
and has shifted the entire injury to the perhaps equally faultless
adult.5 This note will attempt to show the application of the above
1 Petit v. Liston, 97 Ore. 464, 465-67, 191 P. 660, 661 (1920); cf. Johnson
v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 Minn. 365, 59 N.W. 992 (1894).
2 Cf. Edge, Voidability of Minors' Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine in a
Modern Economy, 1 GA. L. REV. 205, 255-56 (1967). "The present case law
often gives conflicting, poorly reasoned, and generally unsatisfactory answers
to many of these questions. This in great part is caused by the fact that
judges either (1) do not properly analyze a problem because they have not
really examined the goal to be fostered through the infancy doctrine, or
(2) they see the rationale upon which the voidability concept is based to be
so unrealistic when applied to modern economically sophisticated youth that
they rebel against the assumption that the minor needs the protection." Id. at
256.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 255.
5 See, e.g., Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109, 116 S.E.
261 (1923), as an example of "over-protectionism" on the part of the courts.
The dissent of Justice Stacy brings out this point:
"I recognize the force of the argument that the dominant purpose of the
law in permitting infants to disaffirm their contracts is to protect children
and those of tender years from their own improvidence, or want of discre-
tion, and from the wiles of designing men. But when this right is used to
relieve minors from their liability for torts and deliberate wrongs [fraud-
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principles, especially with reference to California law; it will also
suggest that they are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that an
integration may be achieved by the application of general rules of
law and equity.
The Majority Rule
A great deal has been written on the general view of the courts
toward infants' contracts and the rules which have developed under
the common law, both in England and in the United States., In
order to provide some background and, more importantly, to indicate
the basic rationale behind the American majority rule, this material
will be reviewed very briefly.
When an infant disaffirms his contract, in the great majority of
the states he need not return any of the consideration he received
under the contract except for that which remains in his possession
in specie,7 i.e. he need not account for any property which he has
lost, squandered or dissipated.8 He has no obligation to put the
other party in status quo,9 nor to account for use, depreciation or
damage to the property while in his possession.'0 Thus, in a case
where the value of the use and depreciation of the property exceeded
the amount actually paid by the minor, the infant was allowed to
recover the full amount he paid without diminution. 1
In those states following the majority rule, the courts consider
the welfare of the infant to be of paramount importance"2-even
to the exclusion of doing equity to the other party.13 They argue
that the reason the law allows the infant the privilege of disaffirming
is to protect him against the immaturity and improvidence which
lead him into making unwise contracts.14 This purpose would be
ulent misrepresentations of age], the very protection which was intended as
a shield to them becomes a sword in their hands. Jealous as the law may be
of the rights of infants, it seems to me that, in the case at bar, this solicitude
has reached the stage of 'a vaulting ambition which o'erleaps itself and falls
on t'other side.'" Id. at 119, 116 S.E. at 265-66.
6 See, e.g., Hartwig, Infants' Contracts in English Law with Common-
wealth and European Comparisons, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 780 (1966); Note,
Liability of the Infant in Contract, 20 IowA L. REv. 785 (1935); 43 C.J.S.
Infants §§ 71-75 (1945); Annot, 124 A.L.R. 1368 (1940).
7 Shutter v. Fudge, 108 Conn. 528, 143 A. 896 (1928); Snodderly v.
Brotherton, 173 Wash. 86, 21 P.2d 1036 (1933).
8 McGuckian v. Carpenter, 43 R.I. 94, 110 A. 402 (1920).
9 Gillis v. Goodwin, 180 Mass. 140, 61 N.E. 813 (1901).
10 See, e.g., id. (use); Freiburghaus v. Herman Body Co., 102 S.W.2d 743
(Mo. Ct. App. 1937) (depreciation); Bowling v. Sperry, 133 Ind. App. 692, 184
N.E.2d 901 (1962) (damage).
11 Whitcomb v. Joslyn, 51 Vt. 79 (1878).
12 See, e.g., Snodderly v. Brotherton, 173 Wash. 86, 21 P.2d 1036 (1933);
cf. Wuller v. Chuse Grocery Co., 241 Ill. 398, 89 N.E. 796 (1909).
13 Snooderly v. Brotherton, 173 Wash. 86, 21 P.2d 1036 (1933); McGuckdan
v. Carpenter, 43 R.I. 94, 110 A. 402 (1920): "[T]he right of an infant to avoid
his contract is absolute and paramount to all equities." Id. at 97, 110 A. at
403.
14 McGuckian v. Carpenter, 43 R.I. 94, 110 A. 402 (1920). But cf. Edge,
supra note 2, which reviews historical evidence that casts doubt on the time-
honored legal principle that the infancy doctrine arose for the purpose of pro-
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undermined if the protection ended here and the infant were, never-
theless, required to account for property he may have lost, squan-
dered or destroyed: 15
The improvidence which the law contemplates is not simply the mak-
ing of an unwise contract, but very often is the use or misuse to which
the property is put after it is purchased. To deny the privilege or
right of disaffirmance, when that improvidence or folly has become
apparent, would permit the accomplishment of the very thing against
which the law seeks to provide.16
Several other reasons have also been offered for the majority view.
Among these are that requiring restitution would be permitting the
other party to enforce the contract against the infant;1 7 that use and
depreciation are intangible and cannot be restored;' 8 that use is not
part of the property which passes under the contract; 19 and that
if allowance were permitted for use, the minor might be charged with
more than the full contract price.
20
California Law
In California, these matters are controlled by statute.21  This
note shall be primarily concerned with section 35 of the Civil Code.
22
As a result of this statute, and the judicial interpretation made of
it, the California cases present a complete dichotomy as to the effect
of disaffirmance, depending upon whether the minor was under or
over the age of 18 at the time of making the contract.
tecting minors. The article suggests that this was more likely an afterthought
to rationalize a policy developed out of less humanistic considerations. Id. at
219-22. It also advances reasons for doubting that the majority rule as pre-
sently applied "arises out of a real need of minors for the generous protec-
tion afforded them." Id. at 223-27.
15 Weathers v. Owen, 78 Ga. App. 505, 51 S.E.2d 584 (1949).
"[This is nothing more than the law anticipates of him, and he cannot
be required to repurchase the right of reclaiming his own by still further
abstractions from his estate. Otherwise the rule would practically strike
down the shield which the law, by reason of his inexperience and youth,
throws around him." Id. at 508, 51 S.E.2d at 587.
16 Snodderly v. Brotherton, 173 Wash. 86, 90-91, 21 P.2d 1036, 1037 (1933).
17 Utterstrom v. Myron D. Kidder, Inc., 124 Me. 10, 13, 124 A. 725, 726
(1924); McCarthy v. Henderson, 138 Mass. 310, 313 (1885).
18 Utterstrom v. Myron D. Kidder, Inc., 124 Me. 10, 13, 124 A- 725, 726
(1924).
19 Gannon v. Manning, 42 App. D.C. 206, 209 (1914).
20 Creer v. Active Auto Exch., 99 Conn. 266, 280, 121 A. 888, 893 (1923).
21 See generally CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 25-37.
22 CAL. CIv. CODE § 35 reads as follows:
"In all cases other than those specified in sections thirty-six and thirty-
seven, the contract of a minor, if made whilst he is under the age of eighteen,
may be disaffirmed by the minor himself, either before his majority or within
a reasonable time afterwards; or, in case of his death within that period, by
his heirs or personal representatives; and if the contract be made by the
minor whilst he is over the age of eighteen, it may be disaffirmed in like
manner upon restoring the consideration to the party from whom it was re-
ceived, or paying its equivalent." (Enacted in 1872; amended in 1874 to read
as above.)
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Over Eighteen
If the minor was over the age of 18, he is required to restore
the consideration 23 as a condition precedent 24 if he elects to disaffirm.
He must restore the other party to the status quo25-hence, this
position is known as the status quo doctrine.26  If the minor no
longer has the consideration he received under the contract so that
he is unable to restore in specie, he is required to make restitution
of the equivalent in value.27 That he has lost or squandered what he
has received will not prevent the court from requiring that he make
restitution. 28  In California the older minor is governed in many
respects by ordinary contract rules relating to rescission, and in an
action to rescind the court is vested with broad discretion to see
that equity is done.29
If the minor has damaged the property he received, the adult
seller is entitled to a set-off against the recovery granted to the
minor.30 The California courts make no distinction in these cases
between depreciation caused by normal wear and tear of an article
on the one hand, and negligent damage to it on the other.31 Either
way, the minor over 18 must restore the property in as good condi-
tion as when delivered to him or pay its equivalent.32
These principles are well illustrated by the case of Toon v. Mack
International Motor Truck Corp.33 in which the minor plaintiff
had purchased a truck for $7500, making payments totalling $1725.
When the truck was repossessed 5 months later, it had depreciated
$2000 in value due to rough handling. Subsequently, the plaintiff
disaffirmed the sale and demanded the return of his purchase money,
claiming he had fully complied with the requirements of section 35
by merely returning the truck. The appellate court held that the
minor must account for the reasonable use or deterioration in value,34
and affirmed the award of judgment for the vendor in the amount
of $275-the difference between the depreciation and the amount
paid by the minor.35
23 Whyte v. Rosencrantz, 123 Cal. 634, 56 P. 436 (1899).
24 Combs v. Hawes, 2 Cal. Unrep. 555, 8 P. 597 (Ct. App. 1885).
25 Freitas v. Cordeiro, 122 Cal. App. 319, 9 P.2d 882 (1932).
26 The status quo doctrine is also followed in several other states, in-
cluding New York and Oregon. See, e.g., Rice v. Butler, 160 N.Y. 578, 55
N.E. 275 (1899); Gaither v. Wallingford, 101 Ore. 389, 200 P. 910 (1921).
27 Whyte v. Rosencrantz, 123 Cal. 634, 56 P. 436 (1899); Spencer v. Col-
lins, 156 Cal. 298, 104 P. 320 (1909).
28 Whyte v. Rosencrantz, 123 Cal. 634, 641, 56 P. 436, 439 (1899).
29 LeBaron v. Berryessa Cattle Co., 78 Cal. App. 536, 248 P. 779 (1926);
cf. Freitas v. Cordeiro, 122 Cal. App. 319, 9 P.2d 882 (1932).
30 Murdock v. Fisher Fin. Corp., 79 Cal. App. 787, 791, 251 P. 319, 320
(1926). The court, in support, cited cases dealing with actions in rescission
between adult parties.
31 Id. at 789-91, 251 P. at 319-20.
32 Id. at 790, 251 P. at 320.
33 87 Cal. App. 151, 262 P. 51 (1927).
34 Id. at 155, 262 P. at 52; accord, Murdock v. Fisher Fin. Corp., 79 Cal.
App. 787, 251 P. 319 (1926). Both cases are noted in 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 71
(1928).
35 This measure of the required restitution was adopted from the case of
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Thus, the California rule requires that the older minor make
full restitution of all consideration he has received by virtue of the
contract.
Under Eighteen
In the case of minors under the age of 18, however, the judicial
treatment of California Civil Code section 35 leads to exactly the
opposite result. Where a minor has made a contract while under
18 years old and subsequently elects to disaffirm, either before
reaching his majority or within a reasonable time thereafter, he
may do so and recover the full consideration with which he parted,
apparently without an obligation on his part to make any restitution
of the consideration he received.3 6 The case of Tracy v. GaudinT
presented just such a situation. A 16-year-old minor had forged his
guardian's signature on a withdrawal slip in order to obtain guardian-
ship funds with which he purchased a used car from a dealer, paying
in full. He traded this car a few days later to another person as
part payment on a more expensive car. The minor died about a
month later. The court allowed the guardian to recover the full
amount paid to the dealer (on the basis of section 35) although
neither the minor nor the guardian offered at any time to return
the automobile, or its value, to the defendant. It was stated by
the court:
The law is well settled in this state that ... a contract of a minor
under the age of eighteen years may be disaffirmed by the minor, or
by his personal representatives, in case of death, without the return of
the consideration received by the minor....
In this case the minor had received and retained the benefits of
his contract, and was not required to restore the consideration or its
equivalent.38
In justification of this result, the court quoted the explanation
given in the case of Flittner v. EquitabZe Life Assurance Society,3 9
in which a minor plaintiff was allowed to recover in full premiums
he had paid under an insurance contract entered into when he was
16 years old. In Flittner, the court reasoned that the overriding
consideration on which section 35 was based was the protection of
the immature, regardless of the injury to others that a rigid applica-
tion of this standard might entail:
[Tlhe right of an infant to avoid his contracts is one conferred by
law for his protection against his own improvidence and the designs
of others; and though its exercise is not infrequently the occasion of
injury to those who have in good faith dealt with him, this is a conse-
quence they might have avoided by declining to enter into the con-
tract. It is the policy of the law to discourage adults from contracting
with infants, and the former cannot complain if, as a consequence of
Rice v. Butler, 160 N.Y. 578, 55 N.E. 275 (1899). The value of the use is
presumed to include the deterioration in value; therefore the deterioration,
or depreciation, of the property is a part of the consideration received by the
minor and must be restored under CAL. Civ. CODE § 35.
30 Lee v. Hibernia Say. & Loan Soc'y, 177 Cal. 656, 171 P. 677 (1918); cf.
Burnand v. Irigoyen, 30 Cal. 2d 861, 186 P.2d 417 (1947).
37 104 Cal. App. 158, 285 P. 720 (1930).
38 Id. at 160-61, 285 P. at 721.
39 30 Cal. App. 209, 157 P. 630 (1916).
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their violation of this rule of conduct, they are injured by the exercise
of the right with which the law has purposely invested the latter, nor
charge that the infant in exercising the right is guilty of fraud.40
One who deals with the younger minor in California is, thus,
almost in the position of a wrongdoer, worthy of punishment. The
result, as courts have frequently recited, is that one deals with
infants at his peril4 -and that peril may be considerable. The
dangers are further increased by the fact that the California courts
do not recognize fraudulent misrepresentations of age as a ground
of estoppel against the minor invoking his privilege.
42
While at first glance it may appear as though the California
courts have interpreted this statute in the only way open to them,
a closer examination will reveal this not to be the case. Section 35
gives the minor over 18 the right to disaffirm "upon restoring the
consideration" but does not refer at all to the consideration in the
case of the younger minor; it does not say he must restore it, but
neither does it say that he is entitled to retain it. 43  Perhaps the
significance of the additional requirement in the case of the older
minor is only to make restoration a condition precedent to disaf-
firmance and not to endow the younger minor with possessory rights
to property obtained under a contract which he repudiates.
It is interesting to note that this latter interpretation is made in
several states which have statutes copied from the California model. 44
40 Id. at 216-17, 157 P. at 633-34.
41 Burnand v. Irigoyen, 30 Cal. 2d 861, 866, 186 P.2d 417, 420 (1947).
42 Williams v. Leon T. Shettler Co., 98 Cal. App. 282, 276 P. 1065 (1929);
cf. Lee v. Hibernia Say. & Loan Soc'y, 177 Cal. 656, 171 P. 677 (1918); Morgan
v. Morgan, 220 Cal. App. 2d 665, 34 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1963). "The doctrine of
estoppel has no application to infants." Lackman v. Wood, 25 Cal. 147, 153
(1864).
43 There is some controversy among the commentators on whether the
minor in such cases is in fact entitled to retain the consideration. One writer
commenting on Tracy v. Gaudin, 104 Cal. App. 158, 285 P. 720 (1930) (dis-
cussed in text following note 35 supra), suggests that the vendor could regain
possession of the property if it remained in the minor's hands (or in his es-
tate). B. ARMSTRONG, 2 CALIFoRNIA FAMILy LAw 1427 (1953). Another com-
mentator takes the same position, stating that "[a]lthough restoration of con-
sideration is not a statutory condition of disaffirmance in the contract of a
minor under 18, when the minor disaffirms, the consideration which the minor
received and which remains in his hands becomes again the property of the
other contracting party who can enforce restoration." R. Davis, The Minor
as Wage Earner and Property Owner, in 1 THE CAIromNIA FAmIY LAW-YER
689, 698 (1961). While this rule undoubtedly obtains in many states, there
is not the slightest suggestion in Tracy v. Gaudin or any other California
case that such is true in California (nor do the above writers cite any Cal-
ifornia authorities in support of their suppositions). The cases rather indi-
cate the contrary to be true, and this is the interpretation adopted by the
editors of the California Annotations to the Restatement of Restitution: "To
some extent, California must be considered contra to this section [section 139,
that 'incapacity to enter into a contract . . . is not in itself a defense in an
action for restitution'], since where the minor is under 18 there is no duty
to restore; it follows that there could be no liability imposed on him in a
direct action [citing Tracy v. Gaudin and other cases]." CALIFORNIA STATE
BAR, CALIFoRuiA ANNOTATIONS TO THE RESTATEmENT Or RESTITUTiON § 139
(1940).
44 IDAHO CODE § 32-103 (1963); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-10-11 (1960);
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For example, in Gage v. Moore,45 an Oklahoma case, a 14-year-old
boy purchased a motor bike from the defendant for cash and a few
days later sought to get his money back. Relying on the Oklahoma
statute, the court stated that the plaintiff,
Eb] eing under the age of 18, . . .could disaffirm the contract and re-
cover the purchase price paid. Whether or not there was a valid offer
to return the consideration is of no effect. Of course, when he re-
scinds, the property that remains in his hands becomes again that of
the defendant and restoration can be enforced.40
Thus, it appears that a statute such as California Civil Code
section 35 does not compel the result reached by the California courts
with respect to minors under the age of 18.47  The interpretation
given similar statutes in other states, as indicated above, permits
recognition of equitable rights of the adult party and is the better
view. Disaffirmance by a minor is a right in its nature similar to
that of rescission in the case of an adult,48 and it is desirable that
the general doctrine of rescission be departed from no further than
is necessary for the protection of the infant.49 The infant is as fully
protected as he needs to be if he can escape any obligations under
the contract and recover all that he has paid in excess of the value
he received; it is unnecessary and unjust to penalize the adult, who
has fairly and innocently contracted with a minor, by denying him
restitution.50
The reasons which cause incapacity to make contracts ... do not
apply to actions for restitution which are based on unjust enrichment.
It is fair that... infants, even if they are not required to perform
their promises, .... should be required to return benefits which they
have received, at least if they are still in possession of the subject
matter or its proceeds.51
Toward a Resfitution Theory: The Provident-Contract Rule
A minority of the states have adopted the "provident-contract"
or "benefit" rule. This view overcomes many of the difficulties in-
herent in both the majority rule and the status quo doctrine. It has
the advantage of being more logically consistent than the majority
rule as well as recognizing that both parties to the contract may have
rights which deserve protection. While agreeing that the minor does
not possess the discretion and experience of adults and must there-
fore be protected against his own contractual follies, 52 the courts
advocating the so-called "provident-contract rule" go on to acknowl-
edge that a fair and honest contract may well be to the minor's
15 OKLA. ST. ANN. § 19 (1966); S.D. CODE § 43.0105 (1939).
45 200 Okla. 623, 198 P.2d 395 (1948).
46 Id. at 625, 198 P.2d at 396.
47 See also Commercial Credit Co. v. Mizer, 50 Idaho 388, 296 P. 580
(1931); Gruba v. Chapman, 36 S.D. 119, 153 N.W. 929 (1915).
48 LeBaron v. Berryessa Cattle Co., 78 Cal. App. 536, 248 P. 779 (1926).
49 Lemmon v. Beeman, 45 Ohio St. 505, 15 N.E. 476 (1888).
50 See Johnson v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 linn. 365, 59 N.W.
992 (1894); Bartlett v. Bailey, 59 N.H. 408 (1879). See also Note, 81 U. PA.
L. REV. 731 (1935).
51 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 139, comment a at 559 (1940).
62 Porter v. Wilson, 106 N.H. 270, 209 A.2d 730 (1965).
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benefit 53 and, if so, should be viewed favorably by the law.54 Alljurisdictions agree that minors' contracts for necessaries are enforce-
able by the other party,55 and it is argued that this position repre-
sents but a special application of a broader principle:
The right to recover for necessaries is given, because the infant
has derived a benefit therefrom. It is upon no other ground. If the
benefit is the foundation of the right, why should it be limited to
necessaries? It cannot be said that the infant, if engaged in trade or
business, may not derive a benefit therefrom. If benefit obtained by
the infant is the test in one case, why not make it the test in all cases?
... The true rule is, that the contract of an infant. .. , whether exe-
cuted or executory, cannot be rescinded or avoided without restor-
ing to the other party the consideration received, or allowing him to
recover compensation for all the benefit conferred upon the party
seeking to avoid the contract. 50
In operation the principle requires the party dealing with the
infant to have acted fairly and in good faith. Where the adult has
been guilty of fraud or overreaching he is not entitled to recover the
property he parted with under the contract, except for that which
the infant still retains in specie;57 and the burden is on the other
party to show he dealt fairly with the minor.58
As a further prerequisite to allowing recovery to the adult,
the court must find the contract to be a reasonable and provident
one for the minor.59 This requisite may in fact be somewhat super-
fluous. Since the minor is only liable-not on the contract, but in
restitution--for the benefits he received under the contract, he
will not have received benefits commensurate with his consideration
unless the contract is reasonable and provident from his stand-
point, i.e. one which does not waste his estate, but is advantageous
to him. 1
Under the provident-contract rule, once the court has made these
determinations, the minor may be permitted to rescind if that is the
reasonable thing for him to do,62 i.e. if the contract was not wholly
to his benefit and enforcing it would waste his estate. 3 Where the
infant either has parted with the consideration he received, or has
received intangible benefits which are incapable of restoration to the
53 Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N.H. 354, 357-59 (1879).
54 Id. at 357-59; cf. Edge, Voidability of Minors' Contracts: A Feudal Doc-
trine in a Modern Economy, 1 GA. L. REV. 205, 230-32 (1967).
55 43 C.J.S. Infants § 78 (1945). As this section indicates, however, there
is not complete agreement as to what items are to be classified as necessaries.
56 Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N.H. 354, 359 (1879); accord Porter v. Wilson,
106 N.H. 270, 209 A.2d 730 (1965).
57 Gislason v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., 194 Minn. 476, 479, 260 N.W. 883,
884 (1935).
58 Id. at 478, 260 N.W. at 884; Johnson v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
56 Minn. 365, 377, 59 N.W. 992, 994 (1894).
59 Kochendorfer v. McKercher, 116 Minn. 536, 133 N.W. 1133 (1911).
60 Porter v. Wilson, 106 N.H. 270, 209 A.2d 730 (1965); cf. Johnson v.
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 Minn. 365, 59 N.W. 992 (1894).
61 Berglund v. American Multigraph Sales Co., 135 Minn. 67, 160 N.W.
191 (1916).
62 Wooldridge v. Lavoie, 79 N.H. 21, 104 A. 346 (1918).
68 Johnson v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 Minn. 365, 59 N.W. 992
(1894).
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other party, his recovery on disaffirmance is limited to payments he
may have made in excess of the actual benefit he received.6 4 Where
he can return the property received under the contract, the minor
is again liable for the value of the benefits he received, 5 including
the use and depreciation of the property while in his possession.66
Suppose, for example, a 16-year-old contracts to buy a used
car from a dealer for $800, with a $200 down payment and installments
of $100 per month. He uses it both for pleasure-riding and for
transportation to and from his part-time job. After 3 months, having
made two additional payments of $100, he decides to disaffirm and
demands the return of his money. The car during the period it
was in the minor's possession depreciated in the amount of $125.
In this situation the court could find that using a car for pleasure-
riding was of no real benefit to a 16-year-old boy, but that using
it to travel between his home and job was a benefit to the extent of
$20 per month. Consequently, the court would order the car returned
to the vendor, who in turn would be required to refund all but $60
of the purchase money.
If, on the other hand, the court should conclude that the dealer
had taken unfair advantage of an unsophisticated infant by selling
him a car fairly worth only $500, the court would order restoration
of the full purchase price and the dealer would be entitled only to
a return of the car in its then existing condition.
In all such cases, benefit is measured by the value to the minor
according to his "station in life,"67 considering all the circumstances.
68
This value is to be determined by the court69 and is not necessarily
the same as the market value or contract price of the property
7 0
64 Id. (life insurance). Under the usual status quo doctrine, the minor
need not make restitution for intangible benefits. See, e.g., Icovino v. Haymes,
191 Misc. 311, 77 N.Y.S.2d 316 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1948) (music lessons). The
California rule, however, is to the contrary. Spencer v. Collins, 156 Cal. 298,
104 P. 320 (1909) (legal services).
65 Wooldridge v. Lavoie, 79 N.H. 21, 104 A. 346 (1918) (automobile).
60 Id. "Depreciation" is a somewhat misleading term when used in this
connection since it is measured by the value of the minor's use, rather than
by decrease in market value; it is, therefore, a sort of "subjective" deprecia-
tion. Thus, damages caused by the minor to the other's property are not part
of the benefit he receives, and he is not required to make restitution for such
losses. Stack v. Cavanaugh, 67 N.H. 149, 30 A. 350 (1892). The rule under
the status quo doctrine is, of course, otherwise. See text accompanying notes
21-33 supra.
67 Wooldridge v. Lavoie, 79 N.H. 21, 22, 104 A. 346, 347 (1918).
68 Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N.H. 354 (1879).
"The question whether the infant has received a benefit,-like the question
of what are necessaries, and what sum the infant ought to pay for them,...
and other similar questions,-is one of mixed law and fact. No uniform rule
can be established. A contract, which under some circumstances to one person
might be beneficial, under others and to another might be injurious. In no
two cases are we likely to find the same facts; and it must always be for the
trier to apply the law to the facts, and determine whether the infant has been
benefited, and to what extent." Id. at 359.
09 Porter v. Wilson, 106 N.H. 270, 209 A.2d 730 (1965).
70 Wooldridge v. Lavoie, 79 N.H. 21, 104 A. 346 (1918).
"While it is true . . . that the pleasure derived from the use of a car
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or services.71 The value to the minor will vary according to the use
to which he puts the contract property, e.g. he receives more benefit
from an automobile when he employs it in his job than when he
uses it solely for pleasure.7 2
Misrepresentations of age by the minor will not estop him from
avoiding his contracts under this view.7 3 They may, however, entitle
the vendor to recover damages for depreciation of the property while
in the hands of the infant notwithstanding the fact that the con-
tract was not a provident one from the standpoint of the minor.7 4
The minority view has received the support of many writers who
have considered the question.7 5 The Oregon Supreme Court, con-
sidering such a case70 on first impression, commended the minority
view as being "best adapted to modern conditions,"77 and one which
"will fully and fairly protect the minor against injustice or imposi-
tion, and at the same time will be fair to the businessman who has
dealt with such minor in good faith."7 8 Not only did the superior logic
and justice of the minority rule appeal strongly to the court, but
also it considered of great importance the individual and social con-
sequences which might result from the failure to adopt such princi-
ples.
79
may be a benefit to a minor within the meaning of this rule, whether [the
minor] was benefited by using this car in the way he did depends on whether
using it in that way was the reasonable thing for a boy in his station in life
to do . . ." Id. at 22, 104 A. at 347. "[The minor] was obliged to account
for the benefits received from the use of the goods. This would be the ben-
efits received by him, not necessarily the market value of such use or the
rental value of the goods." Berglund v. American Multigraph Sales Co., 135
Minn. 67, 72, 160 N.W. 191, 193 (1916).
71 Porter v. Wilson, 106 N.H. 270, 209 A.2d 730 (1965).
72 Cf. Wooldridge v. Lavoie, 79 N.H. 21, 104 A. 346 (1918).
73 Conrad v. Lane, 26 Minn. 389, 4 N.W. 695 (1880).
74 Steigerwalt v. Woodhead Co., 186 Minn. 558, 244 N.W. 412 (1932). The
test becomes in such instances one of "objective" depreciation (see note 65
supra), i.e. the same utilized under the status quo doctrine. See text accom-
panying notes 21-33 supra.
75 See, e.g., 2 S. WiLisToN, CONTRACTs § 238, at 43 (3d ed. W. Jaeger
1959): "This seems to offer a flexible rule which will prevent imposition up-
on the infant and also tend to prevent the infant from imposing to any serious
degree upon others." J. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMEsTic RELATIONS 592 (1931):
"The doctrine of 'benefits' has good possibilities for the solution of this diffi-
cult question and deserves wider adoption."
76 Petit v. Liston, 97 Ore. 464, 191 P. 660 (1920).
77 Id. at 470, 191 P. at 662.
78 Id. Unfortunately the Oregon Supreme Court, while claiming to adopt
the benefit doctrine, misapplied it and measured benefit by the market value
of the damage to the motorcycle while in plaintiff's hands. This is actually
the status quo doctrine of California (for minors over 18) and New York
which the court does not distinguish from the benefit or provident-contract
doctrine of New Hampshire and Minnesota. The court's rationale, neverthe-
less, is sound.
79 Id. at 470-71, 191 P. at 662. "[I]t will not exert any good moral in-
fluence upon boys and young men, and will not tend to encourage honesty
and integrity, or lead them to a good and useful business future, if they are
taught that they can make purchases with their own money, for their benefit,
and after paying for them in this way, and using them until they are worn
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Conclusion
What evaluation can be made of the existing techniques used for
dealing with disaffirmance of minors' contracts? Of the three methods
currently employed, the benefits doctrine seems generally superior.
It offers the most individualized treatment of the infant's contractual
capacity, determined by careful personal attention on the part of the
court rather than by legislative fiat. This very factor, however,
creates perhaps the major drawback of the benefits doctrine. The
degree of restitution to be required of the minor is determined by
the court from its investigation into the personal circumstances of
the minor. It is just this information that the adult must know,
therefore, in order to deal confidently with the minor. But such
information is generally lacking. The adult cannot know whether
the particular minor will benefit from the contract in the opinion
of the court; he generally does not know the minor's "station in
life," nor his special needs for the property in question. Thus, uncer-
tainty is present in any dealings with minors.
This drawback, however, is not sufficient to outweigh the mani-
fest advantages of the benefits doctrine over the other two theories.
With the exercise of reasonable judgment by the merchant, these
problems should not be serious; the major concern of the courts
should be to insure that the transaction is free from those elements
of overreaching and fraud that should be fairly obvious to anyone.
And while it is true that the benefits doctrine reduces the degree of
protection afforded infants under the majoity rule, it does so only
to the extent necessary to prevent their unjust enrichment at the
expense of the other party.
The weakness of the alternative status quo doctrine is that it
practically eliminates the protection given to the infant; in effect
he is held liable in quasi-contract for the value of the consideration
received on all his contracts, whether provident or not. If the argu-
ment that the infant needs protection against his own immaturity
is correct, it must be admitted that this approach fails to provide such
protection. This doctrine, however, is interesting in revealing the
attempts made to avoid the obvious injustice of the majority rule.
It must be conceded that in certain instances the status quo doc-
trine does achieve desirable results. These situations involve contracts
made by older minors who are mature in appearance and conduct.80
Under such circumstances in some jurisdictions, such minors are held
to be bound absolutely by their contracts.81 This suggests one needed
out and destroyed, go back and compel the business man to return to them
what they have paid upon the purchase price. Such a doctrine, as it seems
to us, can only lead to the corruption of young men's principles and encourage
them in habits of trickery and dishonesty." Id. See also Robertson v. King,
225 Ark. 276, 282, 280 S.W.2d 402, 406 (1955) (dissenting opinion): "Obviously,
justice, common honesty and decency require all to pay their just obligations.
Courts should therefore exhaust every means available to force slackers, in-
cluding infants, to honor their contracts."
80 See text accompanying notes 21-33 supra.
81 See, e.g., First State Bank v. Edwards, 245 S.W. 478 (Tex. Civ. App.
1922).
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and often recommended change:82 the lowering of the age level
at which a minor can disaffirm his contracts to perhaps 18 years.
83
This change would help considerably since the older infant more
often contracts than does the younger and also infants under 18 are
more easily recognized. The modern sophisticated youth should be
treated in a manner more in keeping with his present emancipated
status which to a large extent has removed the necessity of keeping
him a special charge of the law.
Arguments advanced by those courts denying the adult the
right to invoke estoppel against a minor who has misrepresented his
age surely miss the point. First, estoppel does not "make the
contract good," as has been suggested,8 4 since it is good unless avoided;
estoppel only operates to keep it good by preventing disaffirmance8 5
The second point is superficially more persuasive: it is claimed that
the defense of immaturity presupposes the infant's incapacity to
act prudently-not only to make a contract but also to act so as to
estop himself from avoiding it. 8 6 Here the full context of the situa-
tion must be kept in mind. If one is sufficiently mature in appear-
ance and action to reasonably mislead an adult into believing that
he is capable of contracting, it seems fair to charge him with the
responsibility for his deception and treat him as an adult.8 7 Of
course the court must ultimately decide whether the adult was reas-
onably deceived under the circumstances.
82 See, e.g., Mehler, Infant Contractual Responsibility: A Time for Re-
appraisal and Realistic Adjustment?, 11 KAN. L. REv. 361, 373 (1963); Note,
The Status of Infancy as a Defense to Contracts, 34 VA. L. REv. 829, 833 (1948).
83 See generally Edge, Voidability of Minors' Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine
in a Modern Economy, 1 GA. L. REV. 205 (1967). "This decision should be
made only after a realistic and intelligent consideration of who actually needs
protection; and such a determination would require more studies about the
child's capacities, especially in regard to his engaging in various kinds of
economic transactions." Id. at 232.
A bill recently introduced in the California Senate would lower to 18
years the age at which a minor may disaffirm his contracts, by deleting from
California Civil Code sections 35-37 all references to disaffirmance by minors
over 18. Section 35, supra note 22, would be amended by deleting the final
clause following the word "representatives." S.B. 333 (1968). While a de-
sirable step, this change could compound the uncertainty as to the measure
of restitution to be required from the minor under 18. Since the deleted seg-
ment of section 35 contains the only reference to restoration of consideration
by the minor, passage of the amendment would eliminate the statutory basis
of the status quo doctrine in California.
84 Tobin v. Spann, 85 Ark. 556, 559, 109 S.W. 534, 535 (1908); Keen v.
Coleman, 39 Pa. 299, 302 (1866).
85 Miller, Fraudulent Misrepresentations of Age as Affecting the Infant's
Contract-A Comparative Study, 15 U. PxiT. L. REV. 73, 80, 89 (1953).
86 See, e.g., International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N.Y. 188, 197,
99 N.E. 722, 726 (1912); Tobin v. Spann, 85 Ark. 556, 559, 109 S.W. 534, 535
(1908).
87 New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 188 Ky. 183, 190-91, 221 S.W.
245, 249 (1920); Note, The Status of Infancy as a Defense to Contracts, 34
VA. L. REv. 829, 832 (1948); cf. First State Bank v. Edwards, 245 S.W. 478 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1922), where the minor was estopped by his appearance alone with-
out any verbal misstatements by him.
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A few states recognize estoppel by statute.88 Several others
permit the adult to maintain a separate action in tort for fraud.8 9
This may be a somewhat less severe remedy than that of estoppel
since damages are limited to the injury caused by the fraud.90 Any
of these solutions seem acceptable and all are unquestionably pref-
erable to the present California rule on the subject.91
The minor should be liable in restitution for the value of the
use of the property, but not for damage he may have caused to it
since this is not part of the benefit he received. Furthermore, it
would otherwise make it more advantageous from the vendor's stand-
point to sell to an obviously immature minor who would be likely
to totally destroy the property.
In all cases involving minors' contracts, the courts should take
care to perceive the full context of the problem. If they overlook
the facts of the particular situation, an equitable principle developed
to meet a specific need may harden into rigid legalism. "The end of
the privilege is to protect infants. To that object, therefore, all the
rules and their exceptions must be directed."
0 2
Robert K. Regan*
88 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 599.3 (1966); REV. WASH. CODE ANN. § 26.28.040
(1961). These statutes prevent disaffirmance of any contract where from the
minor's own misrepresentations of his age or from his having engaged in
business the other party had good reason to believe him to be capable of
contracting.
89 See Annot., 67 A.L.R. 1264 (1930).
90 Note, Liability of the Infant in Contract, 20 IowA L. Rnv. 785, 791-93
(1935).
91 See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
92 Zouch v. Parsons, 96 Eng. Rep. 332, 333 (K.B. 1765), quoted in Hall v.
Butterfield, 59 N.H. 354, 357 (1879).
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